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TREATING THE BLUE RASH: WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS
AND IMPROVING THE LAND EXCHANGE PROCESS
Smith Monson ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of federal, state, and private land throughout the West has
resulted in a fragmented ownership pattern where “no single owner . . . owns enough
contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings,” generating “a
plethora of disputes over access and similar problems.” 1 In particular, the
disbursements of state trust lands under the western states’ enabling acts have
created what is known as the “blue rash” on maps of the West.2
The blue rash spreads into many areas of federal conservation and reservation
creating two problems: (1) it limits federal land managers’ ability to effectively
manage environmentally sensitive areas and (2) it complicates management for state
trust land authorities, who try to generate revenues for schools and other institutions.
Both federal and state interests are important in preserving western lands and helping
western states increase resources for education.
The controversy created by the blue rash is a perennial problem. In an attempt
to solve the woes resulting from fragmented ownership of western lands, federal
agencies and state trust authorities seek to exchange land. They conduct these
exchanges administratively under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) of 1976 3 and legislatively by lobbying members of Congress. While
methods for conducting exchanges present potential win-win solutions to treat the
blue rash, there are many ways they can be improved.
This Note argues that while administrative and legislative land exchanges have
the potential to remedy the blue rash, amendments to FLPMA and other federal
statutes would significantly improve the process. Specifically, federal agencies and
state trust authorities should take three steps: (1) Congress should grant more
funding by amending the Land and Water Conservation Fund to solve agency
dilemmas; (2) Congress should amend FLPMA’s public-interest- determination
requirement to promote exchanges between federal agencies and state trust land
authorities; and (3) Congress should amend FLPMA’s equal value requirement to
incorporate conservation value as well as other ways to promote fair land exchanges.
By adopting these amendments, Congress would facilitate the land exchange process
and save state trust authorities and federal agencies valuable time and money.

∗

© 2015 Smith Monson.
1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 2:9 (2d ed. 2014).
2
Steven M. Davis, Preservation, Resource Extraction, and Recreation on Public
Lands: A View from the States, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303, 331–32 (2008).
3
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–87 (2012).
1
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Part II of this Note describes the development of the blue rash, including a
history of federal land policies. Next, Part III analyzes the problems created by the
blue rash—namely the conflicting mandates between federal agencies and state trust
authorities. Part IV analyzes legislative land exchanges involving federal land and
land managed by the Utah School and Institute Trust Lands Administration (SITLA),
and argues that while these types of exchanges offer potential win-win solutions,
they also present other problems. Finally, Part V concludes by offering examples of
how amending federal statutes could make administrative exchanges a more optimal
solution.
II. CREATING THE BLUE RASH: A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL LAND LAWS
A. Acquisition and Disposal of Federal Lands
The authority of federal land ownership stems from the Property Clause of the
United States Constitution, which states, “Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.” 4 The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this clause gives the federal government authority to own and
retain lands under Congress’s direction. 5 The Court has said congressional power to
exercise its authority over federal land is “without limitations.” 6
Federal land acquisition began early, when during the nation’s infancy the
thirteen original states ceded title to the lands west of their borders that Great Britain
had granted to them. 7 The federal government acquired 237 million acres of land
spanning from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River as a result of the
original states’ cessions between 1781 and 1802. 8 The federal government continued
to acquire land through purchase, conquest, or compromise, adding the vast
expanses west of the Mississippi River. 9 Once acquired, these lands became federal
property administered as territories until Congress admitted new states to the
Union. 10 Over time, the federal government acquired more than 1.8 billion acres of
land from purchase, conquest, cession, and treaties. 11

4

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–40 (1976); Camfield v. United States,
167 U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537–38 (1840).
6
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539 (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29
(1940)).
7
PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49–54 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1968).
8
Id. at 49–55.
9
Id. at 75–86; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND
RESOURCES LAW 54–58 (6th ed. 2007).
10
See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 54–58.
11
196 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 2011, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
5
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Disposal of federally owned lands started soon after the thirteen states ceded
their territories. 12 The early federal government lacked the power to tax.13 But the
nation had accumulated large debts from the Revolutionary War. 14 Being land-rich
and cash-poor, the federal government sold some of its newly acquired lands to help
generate revenue, pay down debt, compensate veterans, and provide for public
education. 15
When the Continental Congress passed the General Land Ordinance of 1785
(the “Ordinance”), it established a general policy to generate revenue and pay
debts. 16 The Ordinance also established the federal government’s approach to land
disposal, which the government used for years to come. 17
In particular, two provisions significantly influenced the disposal of land and
the development of the blue rash in the West. 18 First, the Ordinance established a
rectangular survey, which set the standard for all subsequent western land
acquisitions and disposals. 19 The survey divided townships into thirty-six onesquare-mile parcels of 640 acres each. 20 These parcels were numbered, starting with
“1” in the most northeastern corner and ending with “36” in the most southeastern
corner. 21 Second, the Ordinance required that section “16” in each township be
reserved “for the maintenance of public schools[] within the said township.” 22

12

GATES, supra note 7, at 51.
The federal government did not have the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes”
until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI.
14
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 54.
15
See id.
16
28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 375–81 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].
17
See GATES, supra note 7, at 65 (“The rectangular system was one of the great features
of the Land Ordinance of 1785 that has been retained in the national land system ever
since.”); see also JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY,
MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 18 (1996) (describing the General Land Ordinance
as “remarkable for [its] brevity and durability”).
18
See Erin Pounds, Comment, State Trust Lands: Static Management and Shifting
Value Perspectives, 41 ENVTL. L. 1333, 1337–38 (2011); see also SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra
note 17, at 18 (outlining the provisions of the Ordinance).
19
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.3 (1986); see also Jeff Oven & Chris Voigt,
Comment, Wyoming’s Last Great Range War: The Modern Debate Over the State’s Public
School Lands, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 75, 78–79 (1999) (stating that the Ordinance
“initiated a land surveying practice that became the standard for surveying each of the
western land acquisitions that followed”).
20
GATES, supra note 7, at 65.
21
Id. at 125.
22
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 16, at 378; SOUDER &
FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 18.
13
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Following the ratification of the Constitution, Congress continued to pass laws
to facilitate the land disposal process. 23 Congress created the General Land Office
in 1812 24 to oversee the disposal of federal lands under laws like the Homestead Act
of 1862 25 and General Mining Law of 1872. 26 These statutes allowed the Land
Office to grant, sell, or otherwise transfer federal lands into private ownership. 27
Similarly, railroad land grants in the 1870s provided incentives to develop a vast
national transportation system. 28 These laws focused on entrepreneurs, speculators,
military veterans, settlers, railroads, developers, and other private entities. 29 The
transfer of federal lands under disposal laws created the checkerboard pattern of land
ownership in the West that has led to myriad difficulties in managing federal lands.30
In addition to disposing land to private entities, Congress granted newly
admitted states land townships within their borders, furthering the fragmented
ownership in the West and adding splashes of blue to western cartography. 31
Researchers note the practice of setting aside land for education may date back to
Henry V, but in the least, “the idea of granting, donating, or bequeathing land in
support of schools was common throughout the colonial period.” 32 The United
States Supreme Court, while examining claims brought against the State of
Mississippi for allegedly breaching its school trust land obligations, noted Congress
granted these lands for multiple reasons
a combination of an overall practice of encouraging education, a
congressional desire to accelerate the disposition of western lands at a
23

See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64–67 (describing the history of federal land
disposal); see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, § 2:2; JANINE BLAELOCH,
CARVING UP THE COMMONS: CONGRESS & OUR PUBLIC LANDS 1 (2009).
24
BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 1; GATES, supra note 7, at 28 (describing the creation
of the Government Land Office in 1812).
25
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 161) (repealed 1976).
26
ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2012)); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-223, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT:
OBSERVATIONS ON A POSSIBLE MOVE OF THE FOREST SERVICE INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR 7 (2009) [hereinafter GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009].
27
See generally GATES, supra note 7, at 127 (“Thus by 1812 there was created the
administrative machinery that was to manage close to a billion and a half acres spread over
30 states . . . .”).
28
BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 1; see COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 52.
29
See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64.
30
See Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal
Land Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197, 208 (2013) (“The variety of disposal
programs created an assortment of inefficient landownership patterns.”).
31
See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ORIGINAL FEDERAL LAND
GRANT PROGRAM 2, 8 (2011) [hereinafter CEP], available at http://www.cepdc.org/cfcontent_file.cfm?Attachment=Usher_Paper_FederalLandGrants_041311.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3Q6K-GG7W.
32
Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional
Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 803 (1992).
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higher price, and a policy of trying to put the public-lands States on some
sort of a par with the original States in terms of taxable property since
federal land, a large portion of the new States, was not taxable by them. 33
Congress granted states section 16 of each township, fulfilling its promise to
reserve land for the maintenance of public schools under the Land Ordinance of
1785. 34 Ohio was the first state to receive school land grants under its enabling act,
which granted each section 16 to the state legislature. 35 Subsequent states continued
to receive grants until the admission of Alaska to the Union in 1959. 36
However, under successive enabling acts, Congress changed the way it granted
school lands. 37 First, as westward expansion ensued, Congress increased the number
of parcels it granted to the states because western states were arid, not well suited to
farming, less economically valuable, and home to fewer natural resources.38 As a
result, Congress gave section 36 as well as section 16 in the enabling acts for many
western states. 39 When states in the most arid regions entered the Union, Congress
increased the grant to four parcels —as seen in Figure 1—with Utah being the first
of four states to receive the four sections. 40

33

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 269 n.4 (1986).
Id. at 268–69 n.3; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 18.
35
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 22.
36
Marla Valdez, Note, Constitutionality of Educational Land Grants and Mississippi
State Property Interests Under Review in Papasan v. Allain, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 199, 199
(1988).
37
Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79–80; see also Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 803–
32 (describing the “evolution” of the school land grant).
38
See Sean E. O’Day, School Trust Lands: The Land Manager’s Dilemma Between
Educational Funding and Environmental Conservation, A Hobson’s Choice?, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 163, 179–80 (1999); see also Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79. Professors
Jon A. Souder and Sally K. Fairfax also describe, however, that the school land grants played
an integral part of the compromise between states. See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17,
at 19–23. Those states that entered the Union later became more adept at the compromise
and were able to negotiate for more land. Id.; see also Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 815
(“[O]ver time the federal government gave more and more land to new and middle-aged
states before and after accession. The states had become more effective bargainers in their
own behalf.”).
39
See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 20–21, 25–27; see also CEP, supra note
31, at 11.
40
Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 814 & n.47, 835 fig.2; O’Day, supra note 38, at 180.
34
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FIGURE 1. Township survey and land grants in states with four parcels. (Illustration
by author.)
Second, Congress also changed who received the lands. At first, Congress
granted the land to the state legislatures.41 Then, Congress granted the school trust
lands to each of the respective townships. 42 Congress granted the school lands to the
states themselves in the enabling acts of the final states to enter the Union. 43 Finally,
Congress increasingly added language to enabling acts that restricted the use and
scope of school land grants. 44
For example, Ohio’s Enabling Act limits the grant of section 16 “for the
maintenance of schools.” 45 Congress changed course with later enabling acts by
specifying that school land grants were “for the use and benefit of the common

41

Oven & Voigt, supra note 19, at 79–80; Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 817–18.
Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 817.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 818–20.
45
Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 818 (describing Ohio’s enabling act, also known as
the Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173).
42
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schools.” 46 Both the Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889—admitting North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to the Union—and the enabling acts for
Idaho and Wyoming specified terms for the sale and lease of the land and prohibited
sectarian or denominational use of the land. 47 By the time New Mexico and Arizona
acceded to the Union, Congress added further requirements to the management and
sale of granted lands. 48 In the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, Congress clearly
stated that all school and institutional grant lands “shall be . . . held in trust.”49
Several states’ enabling acts do not expressly create a trust for the state over the
school and institutional lands that Congress granted them. But many courts
recognize that states must hold these lands in trust for the benefit of public schools
and other institutions. 50 This is largely a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Department. 51 In Lassen, the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned a decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. 52 The Arizona
decision required Arizona’s state trust land authority to grant a right of way to the
Arizona Highway Department over certain trust lands without compensation. 53
Relying on the terms and obligations in the Arizona Enabling Act, the U.S. Supreme
Court held the Highway Department must compensate the trust for the rights of way.
The Court said, “[t]he Enabling Act unequivocally demands both that the trust
receive the full value of any lands transferred from it and that any funds received be
employed only for the purposes for which the land was given.” 54 Many state and
federal courts have used the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lassen to find that
trust principles govern the school and institutional grants found in the enabling acts
of other western states. 55

46
Oklahoma Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 7, 34 Stat. 267, 272 (1906); see also
Fairfax et al., supra note 32, at 818 (describing the evolution of the enabling acts).
47
ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 676, 679–80 (1889).
48
Act of June 20, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-219, §§ 6–10, 36 Stat. 557, 561–65; see also
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 25–26.
49
§ 10, 36 Stat. at 563.
50
See generally SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 36–37 (“Trust
principles . . . have come to dominate judicial understanding of school grants.” (citation
omitted)).
51
385 U.S. 458 (1967).
52
Id. at 459–60.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 466.
55
See, e.g., Dist. 22 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that although the Utah Enabling Act did not create a federal trust, the
language of the Act gave the Utah legislature discretion to determine management and trust
principles, and holding that the lands were “held in trust pursuant to the Utah Constitution”);
United States v. 78.61 Acres of Land in Dawes & Sioux Cntys., 265 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D.
Neb. 1967) (holding that “the grant was undoubtedly in trust for a specific purpose” and that
the state was still “under a contractual as well as a constitutional obligation to refrain from
disposition or alienation of the use of [grant lands] except as allowed by the enabling act and
the Constitution” (quoting State ex rel. Johnson v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
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In total, the disposition of federal lands, including but not limited to state land
grants, has reached nearly 1.3 billion acres. 56 Congress granted nearly 78 million
acres through school and institutional land grants in state enabling acts. 57
The federal government’s pattern of granting state and private lands created a
fragmented ownership of the American West:
[Today, t]he land ownership map of the West in many places resembles a
crazy quilt, without reason or coherent pattern. Where the effects of the
fragmenting grants to miners, railroads, and states are pronounced, often
no single owner (states, private entities, or the federal government) owns
enough contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings.
Land exchanges and cooperative efforts have accomplished some
consolidation, but fragmented ownership patterns generate a plethora of
disputes over access and similar problems. 58
This fragmented ownership is further complicated by the fact that the federal
agencies that manage the undisposed federal lands must adhere to certain mandates,
which the following the section discusses in more detail.
B. Withdrawal, Reservation, Retention and Federal Land Management Mandates
While creating policies to dispose of federal lands, Congress also adopted
policies to withdraw and reserve certain lands for federal purposes. Withdrawing
federal land removes it from disposal under federal laws. Reserving federal land
removes the land from disposal for a particular national purpose. One example was
The Land Ordinance of 1785’s reservation of section 16 of every township to
maintain public schools. 59 Other reservations included the authorization and funding
of military reservations. 60

8 N.W.2d 841, 847–48 (Neb. 1943))); Cnty. of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576, 583 (Wash.
1984) (holding that the reasoning in Lassen applied to Washington’s Enabling Act).
56
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1.
57
Id. at 5.
58
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, § 2.9 (citations omitted).
59
GATES, supra note 7, at 65.
60
GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009, supra note 26, at 6–7.
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FIGURE 2. Federal land managers in the West. 61
Early on, withdrawal and reservation policies focused on retaining lands for
future disposals or future reservations, including Indian trading posts, military and
mineral reservations, and other public purposes. 62 With the reservation of Yosemite
and Yellowstone in the nineteenth century, Congress paved the way for reserving
lands for recreation and preservation uses. 63 Other national parks followed, and soon
thereafter, Congress enacted the National Park Organic Act,64 laying the foundation
for the National Park System. 65 In 1891, Congress authorized the President to
reserve and protect forests, which led to the creation of the National Forest System. 66
In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt pioneered the use of withdrawal to protect
61

Id. at 14 fig.1.
1 CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR., STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 55–60 (1969).
63
See JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
NATIONAL PARKS 5–8 (1980).
64
National Park Service Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2012)).
65
See SAX, supra note 63, at 5.
66
General Revision Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891) (repealed 1976);
BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 2.
62
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wildlife habitats, leading to the National Wildlife Refuge System. 67 Today, many
federal agencies—including the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—manage these withdrawn and reserved lands. 68
Along with withdrawal and reservation policies, retention policies also created
a marked shift from disposal of federal lands and led to the creation of the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM). Retaining federal lands keeps otherwise disposable
lands in federal ownership. Retention of federal lands started with the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934. 69 Under the Act, Congress created the U.S. Grazing Service to
manage livestock grazing on federal lands, which was the first step toward ending
federal land disposal. 70 As the years passed, controversies arose over the Grazing
Service’s management policies, and as a result, the federal government merged the
Service with the General Land Office to create the BLM in 1946. 71
As the nation’s population expanded and society became more and more mobile,
the demand for public land use increased.72 Congress responded by enacting two
laws in 1964 that continued the shift from disposal to retention. The first law created
the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC), which was to recommend
“modifications in existing laws, regulations, policies, and practices” to determine
whether and which federal lands should be retained or disposed. 73 The second law,
the Classification and Multiple Use Act, ordered the BLM to classify lands for
retention or disposal and to manage those lands for multiple purposes pending
recommendations by the PLLRC. 74 In 1970, the PLLRC completed its commission
and recommended
[t]he policy of large-scale disposal of public lands . . . be revised and that
future disposal should be only those lands that will achieve maximum
benefit for the general public in non-Federal ownership, while retaining in
Federal ownership those whose values must be preserved so that they may
be used and enjoyed by all Americans. 75
67

Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the
Development of U.S. Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 9–11 (2005)
(describing President Roosevelt and the creation of Pelican Island).
68
See GAO FEDERAL LAND REPORT 2009, supra note 26, at 7.
69
Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–
315r (2012)).
70
See id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 1269 (requiring the Grazing Service to manage only those
lands “pending [their] final disposal”).
71
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, § 403, 60 Stat. 1097, 1100 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012)).
72
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1.
73
Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 4, 78 Stat. 982, 983 (expired 1970)
(previously codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391–93); see also id. § 1, 78 Stat. at 982 (detailing the
purpose of the PLLRC).
74
Pub. L. No. 88-607, § 1(a), 78 Stat. 986, 986 (1964) (expired 1970) (previously
codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411–18).
75
U.S. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESS 1 (1970) [hereinafter PLLRC REPORT].
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Following these two laws and the PLLRC’s recommendations, Congress
formally ended the disposal of federal lands by enacting the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976. 76 Section 1701(a) of FLPMA states,
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that . . . public
lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use
planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal
of a particular parcel will serve the national interest.77
“Today, the BLM administers about 247.5 million surface acres of public land
and approximately 700 million acres of Federal subsurface mineral estate in the
United States,” making it the largest of the federal land management agencies.78
Most of the BLM’s lands are in Alaska and eleven other western states. 79
Thus, the withdrawal, reservation, and retention policies of the United States
created a vast management system of federal land that is spread primarily throughout
the West. These policies, along with the disposal policies of much of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, created a land ownership pattern that often makes islands of
state and private land holdings within federally withdrawn, reserved, or retained
lands, or vice versa. In particular, many of the congressionally granted school and
institutional trust lands end up as islands amidst federally owned and managed lands.
Many maps of the West identify school grant lands in blue, 80 which led to the
moniker “blue rash.”
The following section discusses in more detail the problems that arise from
fragmented ownership, particularly as they relate to the objectives of federal land
managers and state trust authorities, whose mandates often conflict and make it
difficult to effectively manage lands in the West.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE BLUE RASH: CONFLICTING MANDATES
The problem with the blue rash in management of western lands is twofold.
First, the fragmented land ownership deters federal land managers from effectively
managing their lands according to their mandates, especially if these lands are
reserved for environmental protection. 81 Second, the fragmented land ownership
76

Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
87 (2012)).
77
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012).
78
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 1.
79
Id. at 7.
80
See, e.g., Utah Land Status and Areas of Responsibility, STATE OF UTAH SCHOOL &
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION (October 2014), http://tlamap.trustlands.
utah.gov/download/maps/statewide/SurfaceMineral_st36x48_shd.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/5Z6B-774E.
81
See Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Land
Planning?, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM
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limits state trust land authorities’ ability to effectively meet their mandates to
manage the land for the benefit of trust beneficiaries like public schools and
institutions. 82
This section begins by briefly addressing the general federal land management
mandates. The section then examines in more detail the conflict between the BLM’s
conservation mandate in managing Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) and the Utah
School and Institutional Land Administration’s (SITLA) mandate to manage state
trust lands.
A. Federal Agency Mandates
The various federal land management agencies operate under different
mandates. Some, including the BLM, operate under more than one mandate
depending on how land is designated. In general, the BLM and the Forest Service
manage their lands under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act. 83 This mandate
requires the agencies to account for multiple uses of the land, including recreation
and providing for a sustained yield of renewable resources, including timber, fish
and wildlife, and forage for livestock. 84 Where BLM lands are designated for
environmental protection, like Wilderness Study Areas, the BLM operates under a
stricter mandate to manage the lands for preservation purposes. 85
Under its mandate, the National Park Service manages lands “in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.” 86 This unimpaired mandate includes the conservation of scenery,
natural and historical objects, and wildlife. 87 Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service
manages its lands for the benefit of present and future generations, conserving and
restoring fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats where appropriate. 88

MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 68, 69 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013) (“[T]he ‘blue rash’ of
state trust lands scattered throughout the West . . . presents multiple challenges to ecosystem
management.”).
82
Jason M. Keith, Note, The 1998 Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act: Project
BOLD II, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 325, 337 (1999). Keith argues that federal
reservations and environmentally sensitive designated areas, like national parks and BLM
Wilderness Study Areas, impact a state trust authority’s ability to meet its mandate when
state trust lands are located within those areas because the development potential of those
lands is limited to the mandate of the adjacent federal land. Id.
83
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 1604(e)(1) (2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1712(c)(1) (2012).
84
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 1604(e)(1); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1712(c)(1).
85
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
86
See 16 U.S.C. § 1.
87
See id.
88
See id. § 668dd.
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B. The Conflict Between Wilderness Study Area and SITLA Mandates
The conflicts between federal land managers and state trust authorities often
occur within federal conservation areas because of incompatible mandates. For
example, as part of the BLM’s multiple-use mandate, FLPMA requires the BLM to
identify “roadless areas of five thousand acres or more . . . as having wilderness
characteristics as described in the Wilderness Act.” 89 The wilderness characteristics
under the Wilderness Act include land that
(1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of
nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable;
(2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and
unconfined type of recreation;
(3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and
(4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific,
educational, scenic, or historical value. 90
Once the BLM identifies potential wilderness areas, it must send them to
Congress for review and designation. 91 After review, Congress may designate these
areas as wilderness areas for the preservation of the wilderness resources or release
them for non-wilderness uses. 92 The areas pending review are known as Wilderness
Study Areas (WSAs), and, pending such review, the BLM “shall continue to manage
such lands . . . in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for
preservation as wilderness.” 93 This language is known as the non-impairment
standard. 94
Generally, the non-impairment standard requires the BLM to prohibit actions
or impacts that contradict Congress’s prerogatives under the Wilderness Act. 95
Specifically, the non-impairment standard precludes road construction or other
surface-disturbing development activities, effectively eliminating development
within WSAs. 96
SITLA’s mandate requires that trust lands be managed in the “most prudent and
profitable manner possible” to support public schools and institutions. 97 In doing so,
89

43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
91
43 U.S.C. § 1782(a)–(b).
92
Id. § 1782(c).
93
Id.
94
See generally Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 59 (2004)
(identifying section 1782 as a non-impairment standard).
95
See 43 U.S.C. § 1782; 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
96
See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (prohibiting all commercial enterprises within designated
wilderness areas except existing road construction, motorized equipment, facilities, and
private rights).
97
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53C-1-102(2)(b) (West 2014).
90
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SITLA “must be concerned with both income for the current beneficiaries and the
preservation of trust assets for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of
short and long-term interests so that long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to
maximize short-term gains.” 98 However, the mandate of each state’s trust land
authority should not be simplified as merely creating an obligation to “secure the
highest monetary return” for its beneficiaries. 99 Rather,
the trust doctrine is more flexible than supposed. Maximum economic
benefit is a very flexible mandate. More important, the trust mandate to
preserve the corpus of the trust while making the trust productive permits
more conservative management, and a broader range of social benefits,
than the maximum benefits perspective at first implies.100
When SITLA lands are found within federal reservations and preservation areas
like WSAs, it invites conflict between the state and federal authorities. The conflict
arises because the federal mandates limit the development potential of SITLA and
other states’ trust authorities’ lands. 101 Similarly, the landlocked SITLA and state
trust authority lands limit the ability of the BLM and other federal agencies to
manage and protect wilderness. This is because the state trust authorities may seek
to develop their inholdings, resulting in roads or other improvements within a WSA
or other preservation area.102
IV. TREATING THE BLUE RASH WITH LAND EXCHANGES: THE POTENTIAL WINWIN SOLUTIONS AND IMPROVING THE PROCESS
To treat the conflicting mandates that arise from the blue rash, many state trust
authorities and federal agencies have sought to use the land exchange process.103
Currently, there are two processes available to effect land exchanges between federal
and nonfederal parties, including state trust authorities. First, parties may work
directly with federal agencies—generally the BLM or Forest Service—to negotiate
98
99

Id. § 53C-1-102(2)(c).
WILLIAM C. PATRIC, TRUST LAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE WESTERN STATES 7

(1981).
100

Id. at 801–02.
See Keith, supra note 82, at 337.
102
See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979) (holding that state trust
authorities must have access to inholdings within federal wilderness areas because “[w]ithout
access[,] the state could not develop the trust lands in any fashion and they would become
economically worthless”); see also Miller, supra note 30, at 213–14 (“The Agencies are
burdened by the perpetual need to provide for and regulate both access across the federal
lands for non-federal inholders and their own access across non-federal lands.”).
103
See Miller, supra note 30, at 215; RALEIGH BARLOWE ET AL., LAND DISPOSAL
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION 141 (1970) (“Land exchanges provide a highly rational solution to an irrational
land management situation.”).
101
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an administrative land exchange under FLPMA. Second, a party desiring to
exchange land with the federal government may work with members of Congress to
authorize or require an exchange.
Land exchanges can be an effective method to treat the problems associated
with the blue rash, and they may even present a potential win-win solution that
allows federal and state land managers to better meet their respective mandates.
These win-win solutions have mostly been effectuated through legislative land
exchanges. However, while land exchanges present win-win solutions, both
administrative and legislative exchanges are difficult and often require significant
resources and time.
First, this section briefly describes the process behind administrative exchanges
and lists potential reasons why state trust authorities resort to Congress when
conducting an exchange. Second, this section examines legislative exchanges in
Utah and how they may provide win-win solutions. Finally, this section argues that,
while important to help address problems with the blue rash, legislative exchanges
do not provide the optimal solution because they fail to effectively involve the public
and require more time and resources than are needed to complete an exchange.
Rather, a better way to address the blue rash is for Congress to amend federal statutes
to incentivize cooperation between federal land managers and state trust authorities.
Such incentives would still allow public concerns to be effectively addressed while
decreasing the time it takes to complete an exchange that would otherwise go
through the legislative process.
A. Administrative Exchanges
Most administrative land exchanges involve the BLM and the Forest Service
because these agencies manage the most acreage of federal land. 104 FLPMA
authorizes both agencies to conduct administrative land exchanges.105 Other federal
statutes, like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), and agency policies place additional restrictions on the exchange
process. 106

104

See Miller, supra note 30, at 206.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1716 (2012). For a more comprehensive discussion of the history
of land exchange law, see Bill Paul, Statutory Land Exchanges that Reflect “Appropriate”
Value and “Well Serve” the Public Interest, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 107, 112
(2006) (describing the history of the Weeks Act of 1911, the General Exchange Act of 1922,
and the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934). The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 added an important
criterion for land exchanges by allowing the Grazing Service (predecessor to the BLM) to
“engage in land exchanges of equal value only if the public interest would benefit from such
exchanges.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
106
See Miller, supra note 30, at 231–33 (outlining restrictions on the land exchange
process under NEPA and other agency regulations); Paul, supra note 105, at 113 (outlining
ESA’s restrictions on land exchanges).
105
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FLPMA provides objectives and procedural obligations for the agency
executing the exchange. 107 Under FLPMA, agencies must adhere to two primary
requirements: (1) that exchanges well serve the public interest and (2) that exchanges
of land be of equal value. 108
First, in considering what well serves the public interest, “the Secretary
concerned shall give full consideration to better Federal land management and the
needs of State and local people, including needs for lands for the economy,
community expansion, recreation areas, food, fiber, minerals, and fish and
wildlife.” 109 These factors must be weighed against the agency’s value in keeping
the land. 110 Such land exchanges may only occur within the same state so as not to
deplete state land holdings and potential royalties in the counties. 111
Typically, courts grant significant deference under the arbitrary and capricious
standard to agency decisions regarding the public interest. 112 In National Coal Ass’n
v. Hodel, 113 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exhibited such deference,
stating “[t]he Secretary’s public interest determination is one involving a variety of
factors, the relative weights of which are left in his discretion. We will not secondguess his conclusion that the [land] exchange . . . was in the public interest.” 114
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals described FLPMA as giving the
agency the “authority and responsibility to define the contours of ‘public
interest.’” 115 Also, the court clarified that the authority to determine whether an
exchange well serves the public interest does not extend to a state “for itself or for
its citizens.” 116
Thus, under arbitrary and capricious judicial review, agency determinations of
what well serves public interest may not coincide with what a state trust authority
determines to be in the public interest. Yet both the federal and state interests are
important. The deferential review may deter state trust authorities from challenging
an agency’s denial of a land exchange for not being in the public interest, potentially
discouraging them from taking part in the process from the beginning.
FLPMA’s second major requirement demands the lands exchanged be of equal
value, as determined by appraisal. 117 If the lands are not of equal value, they may be
equalized in cash payments not to exceed 25% of the total value of the federal land
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43 U.S.C. § 1716.
Id. § 1716(a)–(b).
109
Id. § 1716(a).
110
Id. § 1716(b); see also Paul, supra note 105, at 112–13.
111
43 U.S.C. § 1716(b); see also Holly Chamberlain, A Plan of Action: A New
Alternative to Traditional School Trust Land Exchanges in the West?, 23 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2003).
112
See Nat’l Coal Ass’n v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
113
825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
114
Id. at 532.
115
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Id.
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43 U.S.C. § 1716(b), (d) (2012).
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in the exchange. 118 BLM and Forest Service regulations state, an exchange “shall
comply with the appraisal standards . . . and, to the extent appropriate, with the
[Department of Justice] Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land
Acquisitions . . . when appraising the values of the Federal and non-Federal lands
involved in an exchange.” 119
In Andrus v. Utah, 120 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the Secretary of the
Interior’s authority to determine equal value in the context of exchanges involving
federal and state trust lands. 121 In that case, Utah’s state land authority (now SITLA)
sought in lieu selections, or land parcels elsewhere, to replace originally granted
lands that were unavailable for reasons such as settlement. 122 Utah “argued that the
Secretary of the Interior had to approve any lands that the state chose so long as the
lands were equal in size to the originally designated lands.” 123 The Secretary argued,
however, that the equal value requirement meant equal monetary value and not equal
acreage. Therefore, the Secretary could refuse the selection because the lands the
state sought to acquire and the lands it sought to dispose had a “grossly disparate
value.” 124 The Supreme Court agreed with the federal government, stating that it
could not “identify any sensible justification for Utah’s position that it is entitled to
select any mineral lands it chooses regardless of the value of the school sections
lost.” 125 Thus, in land exchanges, equal value is not a matter of equal acreage; it
considers only equal monetary value.
In determining the monetary value of lands to be exchanged, BLM and Forest
Service regulations require that “[a] qualified appraiser[] shall provide to the [federal
agency] appraisals estimating the market value of Federal and non-Federal
properties involved in an exchange.” 126 In estimating market values, an appraiser
must consider the highest and best use of the appraised properties as well as the
market value or prices paid for similar properties in a competitive market. 127
Courts have held the highest and best use under the Uniform Appraisal
Standards for Federal Land Acquisition means, “the highest and most profitable use
for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the
reasonably near future.” 128 Additionally, courts hold “the highest and best use must
also be: (1) physically possible; (2) legally permissible; (3) financially feasible; and
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Id. § 1716(b).
43 C.F.R. § 2201.3 (2013); 36 C.F.R. § 254.9 (2013).
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446 U.S. 500 (1980).
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Id. at 520.
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Id. at 501.
123
Jeremy Eyre, The San Rafael Swell and the Difficulties in State-Federal Land
Exchanges, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 269, 271 (citing Andrus, 446 U.S. at 504).
124
Andrus, 446 U.S. at 503–04.
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Id. at 510.
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43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-1(a) (2013); 36 C.F.R. § 254.9(a) (2013).
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(4) must result in the highest value.” 129 Thus, potential improvements may be
considered in an appraisal under the above criteria.
While FLPMA governs the land exchange process, other laws significantly
impact the process. One such law is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
of 1969. 130 NEPA is a procedural requirement that ensures a federal agency will take
a hard look at the environmental consequences of a federal action and evaluate
potential project alternatives before making a final decision. 131 NEPA does not
preclude a federal agency from taking actions with adverse environmental impacts;
it simply requires that the agency fully understand and consider adverse impacts as
early as possible in the decision process. 132 The Act states that its policies and goals
supplement those of federal agencies. 133
NEPA requires completion of a detailed statement on the environmental effects
that are likely to result from major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment. 134 This requirement is normally satisfied by completion
of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 135 An EIS must evaluate
environmental impacts and possible alternatives to the action. 136 The lead agency
may prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to determine if the proposed action
would produce a significant environmental impact. 137 If the agency finds no
significant impact, it releases a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which
details why the agency has chosen not to conduct an EIS. 138 Land exchanges are
almost certain to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the
environment, and therefore, require completion of an EIS. 139
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) 140 also significantly impacts land
exchanges. If a listed species is present on lands proposed for exchange, the ESA
requires that the exchange agency enter into consultation with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. 141 Consultation works to “insure that any [land exchange] . . . is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical]
habitat.” 142 Thus, if a species is listed, the ESA applies and may significantly limit
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the parameters of the land exchange. It may also take more time to complete an
exchange because of the mandatory involvement of another federal agency.
Together FLPMA, NEPA, and the ESA require an integrated, holistic
management approach that maintains the biological diversity of plant and animal
species in a given region. 143 This holistic approach prioritizes conservation in the
land exchange process. 144 Indeed, the federal interest in conservation may create an
incentive for federal agencies to engage in exchanges that advance conservation
objectives by facilitating sensitive landscape protection.
The administrative land exchange process has had mixed results over FLPMA’s
lifetime. For example, in a 2009 report, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) showed that from 1989 to 1999 the Forest Service completed an average of
115 exchanges per year. 145 In contrast, from 2000 to 2008, the agency completed
just 29 exchanges per year. 146 From 2003 to 2011, the BLM initiated only 132
applications for land exchanges in many of the western states. 147 These numbers
account for all land exchanges with the BLM, including with private parties. 148
Federal-state land exchanges are presumably an even smaller portion of these
accounted exchanges.
The GAO lists three main reasons for a decline in agency land exchanges: “the
availability of qualified staff, changing priorities, and the availability of funding.” 149
As discussed below, addressing the problems identified by the GAO could lead to a
rise in the number of exchanges between federal agencies and state trust
authorities. 150 In turn, more exchanges could lead to improved efficiency in land
conservation and management and improved revenues for schools and other
institutions. 151
Leading up to these problems, many criticized certain BLM and Forest Service
land exchanges. This scrutiny resulted from many complaints that multiple
exchanges failed to meet FLPMA’s standards. 152 First, agencies did not follow the
143
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Id. at 113; see Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity Conservation and the Intermixed
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requirements needed to show the land exchanges they conducted served the public
interest. 153 Second, many exchanges resulted in a net loss in value of the land
exchanged in contrast to FLPMA’s equal value requirement. 154
In effort to fix the image of administrative land exchanges, the BLM and the
Forest Service adopted more stringent appraisal policies. 155 In a 2009 report, the
GAO said the new procedures required the appraisals to be scrutinized by higher
agency officials. 156 The report states: “To ensure that exchanges were meeting
requirements and agency guidance, both agencies established headquarters
exchange review teams in 1998 and required the teams to review most exchanges at
two critical stages during the exchange process—the feasibility and the decision
stages.” 157
These new appraisal procedures may deter state trust land authorities from
seeking to exchange lands with the agencies administratively because they may
result in lost time and money. 158 This is especially true when agency approval of
appraisals take close to a year or more. 159 After that period of time, an appraisal may
no longer reflect market values, which may pose significant loss to the state trust
authority’s or federal agency’s land values. 160
In addition to delayed appraisal approval, the GAO notes agencies often require
the nonfederal party to pay for the appraisal process because of constraints on the
agency. 161 Thus, the combination of having to pay for an appraisal with the potential
that the appraisal may not be approved in a timely manner creates disincentives for
state trust authorities to seek administrative land exchanges because they may waste
valuable time and money. 162
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The complex and overlapping web of statutes, regulations, and policies
applicable to federal land exchanges necessitates a balancing of numerous
competing but legitimate government interests. Striking this balance takes time and
careful analysis, which can drive up the costs involved in acting upon exchange
proposals. The difficult process of wading through the rigorous public interest and
appraisal standards that protect important federal interests in an exchange may
increase conflicts between the federal agencies and the state trust authorities.
Adding to the conflict, agencies face significant challenges in the exchange
process because of internal agency constraints—loss of qualified staff, decreases in
agency funding, and changes in priorities. Taken together, these strains on the land
exchange process weaken conservation goals for public lands and prevent federal
and state land managers from effectively managing their lands. These constraints
and conflicts may influence state trust authorities to approach Congress to legislate
exchanges, which the next section analyzes in more detail.
B. Legislative Land Exchanges as a Win-Win to Treat the Blue Rash: Examples
from Utah
Utah has often sought legislative exchanges to remedy the problems associated
with SITLA inholdings within federal lands. Starting in the 1980s, Governor Scott
Matheson proposed “Project BOLD” in response to the ruling in Andrus. 163 Project
BOLD sought to facilitate an unprecedented exchange of 2.5 million acres of state
trust lands that were scattered across the state, many parcels of which were
inholdings within protected federal lands, for 2.5 million acres of federal lands that
were consolidated and more suitable for development.164
Though this proposed legislative exchange had great potential, Project BOLD
failed because many feared the valuation process, and it was unclear “how the
different state and federal systems would exchange mineral values.”165 Also, many
did not want to interrupt the status quo, including ranchers and mining companies
that did not want to lose their preferential treatment under the BLM’s land
management. 166 Project BOLD may simply have been too big and come too early. 167
Despite Project BOLD’s failings, other examples from Utah indicate that federal-
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state trust land exchanges may provide a “win-win” solution for all parties
involved. 168
One such example is the Utah Schools and Land Exchange Act (USLEA) of
1998. 169 Leading up to this exchange, President Clinton designated 1.7 million acres
as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument (Monument) in 1996 under
the authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906. 170 Many of Utah’s leaders publicly
challenged President Clinton’s move. 171 SITLA filed suit against the federal
government over the designation because it threatened SITLA’s ability to generate
revenues by creating over 177,000 acres of state trust inholdings. 172
Secretary Bruce Babbitt started negotiations with Governor Mike Leavitt in
response to the SITLA lawsuit and the immediate public outcry related to the
Monument being created “at the expense of Utah’s schoolchildren.” 173 As a result
of the negotiations, Congress approved the exchange of over 376,000 acres of
SITLA inholdings within the Monument and other national parks and monuments,
for federally owned lands, subsurface mineral rights, and $50 million. 174 Congress
also declared the land exchange satisfied FLPMA requirements. 175 USLEA was an
effective, win-win solution because it allowed SITLA to secure lands it could
develop. 176 The exchange also consolidated lands with high conservation value in
the Monument and other federal conservation areas, facilitating effective federal
management of the lands. 177
The Utah Recreational Land Exchange Act of 2009 (URLEA), 178 provides
another example of a win-win solution. Under URLEA, the BLM will acquire over
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See Matthew Kirkegaard, Land Exchanges and Public Land Bills in Utah, 14
HINCKLEY J. POL. 15, 17 (2013) (“Despite the challenges associated with land exchanges and
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Pub. L. No. 105-335, 112 Stat. 3139 (1998).
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Staircase-Escalante National Monument: Is Clinton’s Promise Legitimate or Mere Political
Rhetoric?, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 37, 37 (2001).
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Keith, supra note 82, at 338.
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BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 27–28.
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Keith, supra note 82, at 338, 342–44 (quoting Jim Woolf, A Pretty, Great
Monument?; Clinton Likes it, Many Utahns Don’t, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A1.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 342–43.
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See Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-335, § 2(9), (15),
112 Stat. 3139, 3140–41 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012)) (stating that
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the United States in USLEA was equal in value).
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See id. § 2(3), 112 Stat. at 3139.
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See id. § 2(14), 112 Stat. at 3141 (describing USLEA as resolving “many
longstanding environmental conflicts”).
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Pub. L. No. 111-53, 123 Stat. 1982 (2009).
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25,000 acres of lands “with high conservation and recreation value.” 179 In return
SITLA will acquire nearly 35,000 acres of land with high development potential. 180
The exchange is a win-win because it “protects environmentally-sensitive lands
along the Colorado River corridor and helps position SITLA with lands more
suitable for development.” 181
Lastly, a potential win-win legislative exchange is found in the proposed Hill
Creek Cultural Preservation and Energy Development Act (“Hill Creek”). 182 On
January 22, 2013, Senators Orrin Hatch and Mike Lee introduced the Hill Creek
proposal to prompt the exchange of culturally and environmentally sensitive SITLA
lands found within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation for unappropriated
BLM and reservation lands. 183 As part of the exchange, the federal government and
the state of Utah will retain an overriding interest in the exchanged land because of
the potential for mineral extraction. 184
The Hill Creek proposal is a win-win for two reasons. First, the Hill Creek
proposal allows the federal government, the tribes, and the state to share in revenues
produced on the former reservation lands. Thus, the Hill Creek exchange allows the
involved parties to bypass the equal value requirement by offering a way to equally
share the value of the land. Avoiding the equal value requirement is important in this
case because the valuable mineral resources involved may fluctuate greatly during a
lengthy appraisal process. 185 Second, the Hill Creek proposal is a win-win for
environmentalists and developers because it recommends preservation of high-value
conservation areas and allows mineral extraction in less environmentally and
culturally sensitive areas.
While USLEA, URLEA, and the Hill Creek proposal present win-win solutions
to treat the blue rash, legislative exchanges are not without problems. For example,
URLEA was delayed for a number of years because of the appraisal process. 186
Similarly, there were delays in administrative exchanges because the BLM failed to
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prioritize funding its portion of the appraisal, 187 and mineral potential reports further
delayed the appraisal process. 188
Another way legislative exchanges pose problems is that they require less
public scrutiny to complete an exchange. 189 Criticism exists over the fact that
legislative exchanges do not require public notification. 190 They allow Congress to
bypass important review under NEPA, FLPMA, and the ESA. 191 Further, citizens
cannot appeal Congress’s decision to complete an exchange, and there is no duty to
disclose appraisal information. 192 These are important issues, and the administrative
land exchange process may help address these problems. 193
Lastly, legislative exchanges create complications because they require
significant amounts of time and political capital. For example, Congress legislated
16 of the 132 land exchanges that the BLM initiated and/or completed between 2003
and 2012. 194 Of these sixteen legislated exchanges, the BLM has completed nine and
seven are pending. 195 The nine completed exchanges took an average of nine and a
half years from inception to the date the BLM finalized the exchange. 196
187

Id.
Kristen Millis, State and Federal Land Swap, MOAB SUN NEWS (May 1, 2013, 8:00
AM),
http://www.moabsunnews.com/news/article_3b62cd18-b1d2-11e2-84790019bb30f31a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5VV9-9DRF.
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Additionally, SITLA reports that URLEA took about twelve years to move from
idea to completion. 197
In contrast, administrative exchanges average just over three and a half years. 198
Thus, land managers and state trust authorities lose an average of six years when
completing legislative exchanges. Land exchanges between these land managers do
not need to be so lengthy or costly. The following section details how amendments
to federal statutes could speed up the process and provide incentives for state trust
authorities to use administrative land exchanges instead of legislative exchanges.
C. Amending FLPMA to Treat the Blue Rash Through Administrative Exchanges
Amendments to FLPMA and other statutes could help mitigate the significant
time and costs it takes to complete an exchange and promote cooperation between
the federal agency and state trust land authorities. Administrative exchanges may
also avoid the criticism that legislative exchanges may overlook important federal
statutory safeguards. 199
There are three ways Congress could amend federal statutes to incentivize
administrative land exchanges between federal agencies and state trust authorities:
(1) provide funding to prioritize these exchanges, (2) fast-track the public interest
determination, and (3) allow equal value to include conservation values and revenue
sharing.
1. Increase Agency Funding
With deficits and congressional deadlock over the budget, Congress might be
hesitant to increase agency funding for land exchanges. But because agency funding
could be relatively small, time sensitive, and targeted at removing nonfederal
inholdings from environmentally sensitive areas, Congress should approve the
funding. In particular, Congress should mandate that the funds be used first for the
exchange of school trust lands in areas of high conservation value because of the
public interest in improving federal management of protected lands and the state
interest of generating revenue for education.
While finding funds is a complex issue beyond the scope of this Note, the Land
and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) may be an appropriate source. In 1965,
Congress created the LWCF in a bipartisan effort to safeguard natural, water,

§ 1132 (2012)); BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147. The San Juan Basin Wilderness
Protection Act of 1984 was completed in June 2011. Omnibus Parks and Public Lands
Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333, sec. 1022, § 104, 110 Stat. 4093, 4095
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197
Loyola, supra note 179 (noting the idea for the land exchange started in 2002 and
the exchange was completed on May 9, 2014).
198
See BLM Spreadsheet, supra note 147 (listing land exchanges in western states and
how long they took from initiation to completion).
199
See BLAELOCH, supra note 23, at 12.
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cultural heritage, and recreational resources. 200 The LWCF takes revenues from
resource depleting activities, like oil and gas development, on federal lands to supply
the fund. 201 Originally, Congress created the LWCF with a funding level of $900
million for the purpose of acquiring lands for recreation and conservation. 202
However, Congress has not fully funded the LWCF on many occasions. 203 The
LWCF is set to expire on September 30, 2015. 204
In addition to funding acquisition of conservation lands, Congress should
amend 16 U.S.C. § 460l-9 to include funding for land exchanges that involve the
exchange of environmentally sensitive lands. To make this possible, Congress
should extend LWCF beyond the 2015 deadline. 205 Appropriations for land
exchanges from the LWCF should then authorize funding for exchanges that remove
inholdings from federal conservation areas.
In addition, appropriations should last for a given period, say five to six years,
in which time the agencies would need to work closely with state trust authorities
and other private land owners to effectuate an exchange. Funding for each state
should be based on the amount of inholdings in corresponding federal conservation
areas. This process would insure agencies’ efforts for exchanges are focused on the
most sensitive areas.
Also, providing these funds helps address the major agency setbacks the GAO
identified as influencing the decrease in administrative land exchanges. First, with
funding agencies would be better able to hire or pay qualified realty specialists to
conduct the exchanges. Second, the funds would help focus agency priorities by
facilitating exchanges that consolidate environmentally sensitive areas. Lastly, the
funding would directly address the lack of funding problem. Thus, by providing
relatively minimal and targeted funding, Congress could amend the LWCF and
begin to effectively address the problems created by the blue rash in the West.
2. Public Interest
While providing more funding to bring about administrative exchanges is
perhaps the most effective way to improve the exchange process, it provides only
200
LAND & WATER CONSERVATION FUND, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: FUNDING AND
PROTECTING PARKS WHERE YOU LIVE 2 (2011).
201
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Id. §§ 460l-5, 460l-9.
203
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http://www.nps.gov/ncrc/programs/lwcf/funding.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3YBTU5TU (last modified Oct. 29, 2013) (“Since the inception of the program in 1965, annual
appropriations from the Fund for recreation grants have ranged from a high of $369 million
in 1979 to four years of zero funding from 1996 to 1999.”).
204
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Conservation Authorization and Funding Act of 2013 to eliminate the 2015 termination date
of the LWCF. See S. 338, 113th Cong. (2013). The Bill did not pass out of Committee. Id.
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part of the treatment of the blue rash. To further address the problem, Congress
should increase incentives to complete land exchanges between federal agencies and
state trust authorities by amending the public interest requirement under FLPMA.
In the context of federal-state trust land exchanges, the issue with the public
interest determination is one of focus. FLPMA’s current public interest broadly
focuses on all land exchanges. Yet, the most important public interest consideration
in a land exchange between federal and nonfederal parties is increasing the ability
of federal agencies to effectively manage lands, especially those found in
environmentally sensitive areas. Similarly, there is a strong public interest in
allowing state trust authorities to effectively manage their lands to generate revenues
for their beneficiaries. Thus, for certain exchanges the public interest determination
under FLPMA must be narrowed to reflect these important federal and state interests.
Congress should amend FLPMA to reflect the public interest of removing
inholdings from federal conservation areas and helping state trust authorities meet
their mandates. For example, land exchanges already meet one important public
interest when they involve lands within federally designated environmentally
sensitive areas—they improve federal management. FLPMA amendments should
direct that these exchanges only need to pass through NEPA review and meet the
equal value requirement. 206
Congress could also amend FLPMA to help solve the conflicts between state
and federal interests by limiting the deference courts give to an agency’s public
interest determination in a given exchange. A statutory amendment stating that
federal-state trust authority exchanges are presumed to be in the pubic interest,
unless supported by substantial evidence, could tighten this deferential standard. As
described above, courts review agency exchanges under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. 207 By requiring a substantial evidence standard, an agency could
support its decisions with only what it has on the record.
Arguably, the substantial evidence standard is not significantly different than
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 208 But the presumption that these exchanges
are in the public interest would create a higher standard for the agency to overcome.
Additionally, the substantial evidence requirement still allows an agency some
leeway to reject an exchange. This proposed amendment would address GAO’s
concern with a shift in agency priorities because the presumption would prioritize
these exchanges by potentially incentivizing agency action.
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[the arbitrary and capricious test] requires and what would be required by the substantial
evidence test.”).

268

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

3. Equal Value
In addition to providing funding and refining the public interest determination,
amending FLPMA’s equal value requirement could promote the exchange of federal
and state trust lands. There are three potential ways to amend the equal value
requirement to incentivize exchanges between federal and state trust authorities: (1)
place a time limit on the review of an appraisal, (2) allow appraisals to consider
conservation and ecosystem value, and (3) allow for equal value to include revenue
sharing.
As addressed above, one reason that state trust authorities may not participate
or may lose interest in an administrative exchange is the lengthy appraisal-review
process. One solution would be to legislatively mandate that department review of
an appraisal take place within a period of time so that an appraisal does not lose its
value. Finding the appropriate time frame may need more evaluation, but reviews
that exceed six months should not be tolerated. Requiring timely review of agency
appraisals would also help address the problems related to agencies shifting their
priorities away from completing land exchanges. The timely review will also require
increased funding from the LWCF or other appropriations.
Congress could also amend FLPMA’s equal value requirement to allow the
requirement to include conservation and ecosystem values. Because conservation of
ecosystems provides inherent economic benefits to society, there should be a
mechanism in place for conservation values to be considered in an appraisal. 209
There are a variety of ways to place economic value on ecosystem conservation not
found in the marketplace. 210 Ecosystems may be valued for how they contribute to
society, like purifying water or capturing carbon. 211 Value may also be placed on
conservation actions and their effects on different stakeholders. 212
The equal value/fair market consideration under FLPMA does not account for
the potential ecosystem values. Amending FLPMA to broaden the scope of equal
value could allow ecosystem values to be considered in an exchange, thereby
increasing the value of state trust authority lands that have less development
potential. In addition, it could create more conservation-focused practices among
state trust authorities, giving them a new avenue to generate revenues.213
While it may be difficult to assess a direct value of conservation of western
lands, the fact remains that these land uses are important and valuable to large
segments of the American public. Thus, FLPMA should include a provision that
209
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allows these public values to be considered. Considering conservation values,
however, may cause unwanted results. For example, assessing the value of a given
landscape’s ecological value could be lengthy and expensive. These types of
appraisals may not always be easy to replicate because different lands have distinct
flora, fauna, and sensitive habitats. Yet, even with the potential to increase appraisal
expenses, the costs could be off-set by making sure appraisals are reviewed in a
timely manner.
Another way to incentivize exchanges between federal and state trust
authorities is to amend FLPMA to allow revenue sharing in the equal value
requirement. Revenue sharing entails that both federal and state trust authorities take
equal part in the revenues generated from the lands being exchanged. Equal sharing
in the profits is especially beneficial when exchanges involve lands of high mineral
value because it allows the exchange parties to bypass a potentially cumbersome
appraisal process, as seen in URLEA.
Revenue sharing can be problematic if it applies only to one type of resource
or does not include unknown mineral deposits. 214 Thus, a revenue sharing provision
must accommodate all potential resource development and take into consideration
unknown mineral deposits. 215 Revenue sharing helps protect the federal interest in
not losing highly valuable lands and provides incentives for state trust authorities to
participate in administrative exchanges by limiting the need for lengthy appraisals.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of public land laws from disposal to retention has created a
fragmented ownership in the West. The school land grants led to a spotty pattern of
state trust land ownership. This in turn creates conflict between the mandates of
federal agencies—whose mandate is to protect environmentally sensitive areas—
and state trust land authorities—whose mandate is to generate revenues for their
beneficiaries. Both mandates promote important public interests.
Legislative land exchanges present potential win-win solutions for extricating
state trust lands from within federal conservation areas, but they require a process
that is too long and onerous. However, by improving the process for administrative
exchanges Congress could promote more efficient exchanges and increase
cooperation between federal and state trust land managers. Thus, Congress should
provide funding for land exchanges involving environmentally sensitive areas.
Additionally, Congress should amend FLPMA’s public interest and equal value
requirements to incentivize cooperation in the administrative land exchange process.
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